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ACTION EUR-25

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S E C R E T USNATO 4964

E.O. 11652: GDS 12-31-82

TAGS: PFOR, NATO, MNUC

SUBJECT: SEPTEMBER 13 NPG STAFF GROUP MEETING

REF: A. NPG (STAFF GROUP)WP(74)10(REVISED) DATED AUGUST 13,1974

B. USNATO 4903

C. NPG(STAFF GROUP)WP(74)8(REVISED) DATED AUGUST 5, 1974

D. STATE 193225

SUMMARY: AT SEPTEMBER 12 MEETING, NPG STAFF GROUP DISCUSSED DRAFT PERMREPS REPORTS ON THE NPB STUDY OF COMMUNICATING NATO'S INTENTIONS TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE SHAPE ILLUSTRATIVE STUDY ON AIR DEFENSE USE. ACTION REQUESTED: WASHINGTON COMMENTS ON BOTH REPORTS BY SEPTEMBER 18. END SUMMARY.

1. AT SEPTEMBER 12 MEETING, NPGSTAFF GROUP HELD GENERAL DISCUSSION OF THE DRAFT PERMREPS REPORT (REF A) ON THE NPG STUDY ON COMMUNICATING

NATO'S INTENTIONS (CNI) TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS (THIRD REVISION TRANSMITTED TO WASHINGTON IN REF B). CANADIAN REP (BECKETT) RAISED THE QUESTION OF THE ULTIMATE DISPOSITION OF THE STUDY,
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NOTING THAT OTTAWA HAD THE FEELING THAT SOME "ACTION" SHOULD POSSIBLY RESULT FROM IT. SG CHAIRMAN (SHEARER) SAID THAT ANY ACTIONS THAT MIGHT BE TAKEN ON THE SUBJECT OF CNI WOULD DEPEND ON THE RESULTS OF MINISTERIAL DISCUSSION AT THE ROME

NPG MEETING. HE NOTED THAT SUBJECT OF CNI COULD ARISE IN CONNECTION WITH THEMNC'S SELECTIVE EMPLOYMENT PLANNING AND WITH WINTEX 75. CANADIAN REP SUGGESTED THAT IT MAY BE PREMATURE TO FORWARD THE STUDY TO THE DPC AS ENVISAGED IN REF A.

2. UK REP (BEAUMONT) TABLED FOR CONSIDERATION THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL PARAGRAPH TO FOLLOW PARA 4 OF THE ANNEX TO THE DRAFT PERM REPS REPORT ON CNI (REF A): BEGIN TEXT: 4. WE NOTE THAT THE STUDY, IN FOCUSING ON CNI ACTION THAT MIGHT BE TAKEN IN SUPPORT OF A SPECIFIC USE DECISION, HAS CONCLUDED THAT ANY SUCH ACTION MIGHT CONTAIN A WARNING ELEMENT REMINDING THE ENEMY OF THE CONTINUING RISK OF FURTHER ESCALATION. THE STUDY ALSO NOTES THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE ENEMY REACTION TO A CNI ACTION COULD MOVE SO FAR TOWARDS COMPLIANCE WITH NATO'S WISHES THAT THE USE DECISION ITSELF MIGHT BE NEGATED. BUT THE STUDY DOES NOT ADDRESS THE SEPARATE QUESTION AS TO WHETHER NATO MIGHT SEND A MESSAGE TO THE ENEMY WITH THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF PERSUADING HIM TO DESIST, WITH THE WARNING THAT IF HE CONTINUED HIS AGGRESSION NATO MUST USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IT MAY BE THAT THE LIKELY SHORT INTERVAL BETWEEN A NATO DECISION TO USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE USE ITSELF WOULD MAKE SUCH A MESSAGE IMPOSSIBLE, AND THE ALTERNATIVE POSSIBILITY THAT SUCH A MESSAGE MIGHT BE SENT BEFORE A SPECIFIC USE DECISION HAS NOT COME WITHIN THE AMBIT OF THE STUDY. END TEXT.

COMMENT: UK WANTS TO INCLUDE SOME MENTION OF "WARNING MESSAGES" IN THE PERM REPS REPORT EVEN THOUGH THE DRAFT CNI STUDY DOES NOT ADDRESS THIS SUBJECT IN DETAIL. MISSION SEES NO OBJECTION TO A PARAGRAPH ALONG THE LINES OF THE UK DRAFT ABOVE. THE SG WILL DISCUSS THE DRAFT PERMREPS REPORT ON THE CNI STUDY AT AN SG MEETING TO BE SCHEDULED FOR SEPTEMBER 18 OR 19. ACTION REQUESTED: WASHINGTON COMMENTS ON REF A, TO INCLUDE THE UK PROPOSED PARA 4. ABOVE, BY SEPTEMBER 18.

3. SG SHORTENED THE TEXT OF PARAS 15-20 CONCERNING COMMUNICATING NATO'S INTENTIONS IN THE DRAFT PERMREPS REPORT ON THE SHAPE ILLUSTRATIVE STUDY ON AIR DEFENSE USE (REF C). SHORTENED TEXT IS IN PARA 4
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BELOW. SHAPE REP SUGGESTED THAT FINAL SENTENCE OF PARA 18 OF THE SHORTENED TEXT MIGHT BE TOO CATEGORICAL, AND THAT PERM REPS SHOULD SIMPLY POSE THE ISSUE OF IDENTIFYING THE MODE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS USE AS A SUBJECT FOR DISCUSSION.

COMMENT: MISSION AGREES WITH SHAPE REP. THE IS AIMS TO COMPLETE DISCUSSION OF THE DRAFT PERMREPS REPORT ON THE AIR DEFENSE ILLUSTRATIVE STUDY AT THE SEPTEMBER 18 OR 19 SG MEETING. ACTION REQUESTED: WASHINGTON COMMENTS PROMISED IN PARA 1 REF D, BY SEPTEMBER 18. WASHINGTON COMMENTS SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT SHORTENED TEXT IN PARA 4 BELOW.

4. BEGIN TEXT OF NEW PARAS 15-18 OF REF C:

15. IF HYPOTHETICAL SITUATION ILLUSTRATED IN THE STUDY MATERIALISES AND NATO IS CONFRONTED WITH A REQUEST FOR SELECTIVE EMPLOYMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR AIR DEFENCE PURPOSES, THE MATTER OF COMMUNICATING

NATO'S INTENTION WILL ALSO ARISE. AS THE RECENT STUDY ON THIS SUBJECT OBSERVES, POLITICAL AUTHORITIES WOULD HAVE TO DECIDE WHETHER ANY STEPS SHOULD BE TAKEN TO EXPLAIN ITS INTENTION WITH RESPECT TO THE SPECIFIC USE AND HOW TO CARRY THEM OUT. THE COURSE OF ACTION THAT NATO MIGHT CHOOSE TO FOLLOW WOULD BE BASED ON THE MIX OF POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS THAT EXIST WHEN NATO IS CONSIDERING A SPECIFIC RELEASE REQUEST.

16. A PRIMARY FACTOR, FROM BOTH POLITICAL AND MILITARY POINT OF VIEW, WOULD BE THE EXTENT TO WHICH A CNI ACTION MIGHT REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF ENEMY MISINTERPRETATION OF THE DELIBERATELY LIMITED NATURE OF NATO'S INITIAL USE AND THUS LESSEN THE RISK OF HIS OVER-REACTION. THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR AIR DEFENCE, IF NOT ACCOMPANIED BY ANY OTHER CONCURRENT USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, IS AN EASILY RECOGNISABLE MODE OF EMPLOYMENT, AND MIGHT IN ITSELF CONSTITUTE A SUFFICIENTLY CLEAR COMMUNICATION TO THE ENEMY THAT NATO'S INTENTION IS STRICTLY LIMITED. THE UTILITY OF A CNI ACTION MIGHT THEREFORE APPEAR TO BE LESS SIGNIFICANT THAN FOR MOST OTHER FORMS OF INITIAL USE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE FACT THAT THE TIMING, LOCATION, INTENSITY AND DURATION OF USE MAY BE LARGELY DEPENDENT ON ENEMY ACTIONS THAT ARE BEYOND NATO'S CONTROL RAISES THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE SIGNAL CONVEYED BY THE
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USE ITSELF MAY BE UNCLEAR OR MISLEADING TO THE ENEMY.

17. FROM A MILITARY POINT OF VIEW, A CNI ACTION COULD RESULT IN LOSS OF SURPRISE AND COULD RAISE THE DANGER THAT THE ENEMY MIGHT TAKE MILITARY ADVANTAGE OF ANY ADVANCE WARNING HE RECEIVED HE MIGHT, FOR EXAMPLE, TAKE STEPS TO AVOID HAZARDING HIS ATTACKING AIRCRAFT TO THAT FORM OF DEFENCE, OR REINFORCE HIS EFFORTS TO SUPPRESS NATO'S AIR DEFENCE CAPABILITIES. HOWEVER, THIS AND OTHER CONSEQUENCES COULD FLOW FROM THE ENEMY'S OBSERVATION OF THE FIRST INSTANCE OF NATO'S USE OF AIR DEFENCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS, EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF A CNI ACTION. MOREOVER, THE MILITARY

CONSEQUENCES OF AN ENEMY OVER-REACTION RESULTING FROM HIS MISINTERPRETATION

OF NATO'S INTENTION BECAUSE NATO OFFERED NO EXPLANATION MIGHT OUTWEIGH THE MILITARY DISADVANTAGES FLOWING FROM LOSS OF SURPRISE.

18. WE NOTE THAT SACEUR STATES IN HIS WHISKEY AND ROMEO MESSAGES THAT HE HAS NO OBJECTIONS TO A GENERAL NOTIFICATION BUT REQUESTS THAT THE SPECIFIC MODE OF EMPLOYMENT NOT BE DIVULGED. IT SEEMS TO US THAT SUCH A NOTIFICATION MIGHT CREATE AN ERRONEOUS AND DANGEROUSLY INFLATED WARSAW PACT PERCEPTION OF NATO'S INTENTION.

IF NATO DECIDES TO UNDERTAKE CNI ACTIONS WITH THE ENEMY, IT
MIGHT BE DESIRABLE, AS LONG AS NO OTHER DETAILS ARE GIVEN,
TO STATE THAT NATO IS RESORTING TO CONTROLLED USE OF NUCLEAR
AIR DEFENSE WEAPONS. END TEXT. RUMSFELD

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